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Abstract We study self-referential games in which players have the ability to commit
to a code of conduct—a complete description of how they play and their opponents
should play. Each player receives a private signal about each others’ code of conduct
and their codes of conduct specify how to react to these signals. When only some
players receive informative signals, players are allowed to communicate using public
messages. Our characterization of the effect of communication on the equilibrium
payoffs yields a folk theorem and players share their private information truthfully
in equilibrium. We also provide an application of codes of conduct: games that are
played through computer programs.
Keywords Folk theorem · Self-referential game · Commitment · Communication
JEL Classification C70 · D03
1 Introduction
In many economic environments people develop social norms or conventions when
they regularly play familiar (or similar classes of) games, specifying behavior and
choices everyone is expected to conform to. These social norms naturally endow
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people with the ability to commit, and this in turn allows the possibility that certain
behavior can be visible to other people due to costs of choosing alternatives outside the
conventional norm (see, for example, Schelling 1960; Frank 1988). Such consensus
on behavior gives rise to the emergence of cooperation even when these economic
relationships are not sustained in the long run, and therefore, not susceptible to future
incentives.
In this paper, we examine such situations where players employ codes of conduct
which are defined as a complete specification of how they play and their opponents
should play. Players also receive private signals about what code of conduct their
opponents may be using, while their own code of conduct enables them to respond
to these signals. We focus on the limit case of perfectly informative signals because
we are interested in applications such as games played through agents whose codes of
conduct determine their compensation schemes (the contracts players sign with their
agents are observable), if the agent is human, or are embedded in their programming,
if automated.
We show a folk theorem for finite normal form games using simple trigger codes
of conduct and under two observability assumptions. First, we make the relatively
standard assumption that all players can observe their opponents’ codes of conduct as
in many models of conditional commitment devices (see, for example, Tennenholtz
2004; Kalai et al. 2010). We demonstrate that our codes of conduct generalize the
commitment device space described by Kalai et al. (2010) and we discuss how codes
of conduct can be applied to, but are not restricted to computer algorithms (program
equilibrium as described in Tennenholtz (2004)). These program strategies are self-
referential in the sense that they take as input the opponents’ programs; then they
syntactically compare them with its own description and execute an output strategy
depending whether they are equal or not.
Our main result, however, is for settings in which not all players can observe oppo-
nents’ codes of conduct. In large communities, for example, a group of people can be
excluded frommonitoring or have limited ability to screenwhether other people would
behave within the current convention. In general, it may be reasonable to assume that
people have good information about whether a few people with whom they closely
interact use the same code of conduct that they do, but not so reasonable that they
would have this information about everyone in the community. However, we allow
the possibility that people can communicate via cheap talk what they have observed
about others. Specifically, we extend the idea of self-referential games to assume that
after observing private signals about rivals’ codes of conduct players are allowed to
send public “cheap talk” messages. Communication is per se costless but within the
self-referential frameworkwe show that it becomes a “signaling” device since the code
of conduct includes the cheap talk messages, thereby players may receive different
private signals depending on different message strategies. Although players choose
strategically what to communicate, we show that there is an equilibrium in which
players will reveal their private information truthfully. As a result, our key finding is
that with public communication it is sufficient to get a folk theorem that every player
is observed by at least two other players.
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1.1 Related literature
The key feature that distinguishes our paper from conditional commitment device
models is that our commitment device (code of conduct) is a function of signals rather
than the opponents’ devices. The two most closely related papers are Tennenholtz
(2004) and Kalai et al. (2010) in which agents commit to a particular behavior in
response to their opponents’ device. By contrast, in our model the commitment device
affects the likelihood of signals onwhich the other playerswould base their behavior; it
requires an indirect connection between commitment and observation, thereby relying
on a weaker observability assumption and expanding the number of applications our
model can be used for. Our model encompasses Tennenholtz’s model of conditional
commitment devices where players play through computer programs and receive as
input their opponents’ program. Unlike Tennenholtz, we fully describe the space of
codes of conduct and our folk theorem reaches efficiency. Similar to Kalai et al.
(2010), we characterize the space of codes of conduct avoiding typical circularity
problems, but in contrast to their model, we allow for mixed strategies, do not require
the use of jointly controlled lotteries, and consider normal form games with more
than two players. In their models, every player condition her play on all the other
players’ devices, and their equilibrium construction breaks down if this observability
assumption is not satisfied. Unlike these papers, our main focus is on situations where
players are able to observe some opponents’ code of conduct, and we propose a
theoretical approach for incorporating public communication via cheap talk messages
into conditional commitment device models.
More recently, attention has been drawn to noisy environments; Block and Levine
(2015) examine players that observe imperfectly informative signals about each oth-
ers’ codes of conduct, as Levine and Pesendorfer (2007) do within a evolutionary
framework. Block and Levine (2015) prove a folk theorem for repeated games with
private monitoring. How the period at which players receive signals about others’
codes of conduct affects the equilibrium payoff set was explored by Block (2013). In
a much less noisy environment, Bachi et al. (2014) study games in which deceptive
players may betray their true intentions. They show a folk theorem for two-player
normal form games if the cost of deception is sufficiently low. By contrast, in our
model these kinds of costs are embedded in the likelihood of private signals but could
be readily incorporated. Although a leading example to motivate commitment in this
literature is the idea of a communication phase before the actual play of the underlying
game, to the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that incorporates explicitly
such a communication round.
2 The model
2.1 The baseline game
We study a finite N -player normal form game  = (I, (Si , ui )i∈I ). There is a set
of N players I = {1, 2, . . . , N } indexed by i . Each player i chooses a strategy si
from the finite strategy set Si . Let S = ×i Si be the product space of the individual
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strategy sets. Let s ∈ S denote a strategy profile. The payoff of player i is ui : S →
R.
We write(Si ) for the set of mixed strategies for player i and let(S) = ×i(Si ).
To avoid dealing with measure theoretic considerations when we describe the self-
referential framework, we restrict attention to a finite subset of those mixed strategies
for each player i that we denote by Si ⊆ (Si ) with generic element σi . We extend
payoffs to mixed strategy profiles σ ∈ S = ×iSi in the standard way. Define a
minmax strategy against player i as σ i−i ∈ argminσ−i∈S−i maxσi∈Si ui (σi , σ−i ). Let
ui = ui (σ ii , σ i−i ) be the minmax value of player i where σ ii denote i’s best response
to σ i−i .
2.2 The self-referential game
We present the model and notation that we introduced in Block and Levine (2015).
For any baseline game , we embed  in the self-referential framework, and therefore
define the self-referential game G(). In the beginning of the game G, every player i
privately observes a signal yi ∈ Yi , where Yi is finite. Let y ∈ Y = ×i Yi be a private
signal profile. A strategy for player i in G is a mapping from his set of signals to his
subset of strategies in and amapping for each other player from their set of signals to
their subset of strategies in.We referred to such strategy as a code of conduct denoted
by ri . We emphasize that a code of conduct for each single player specifies how all
players should play. The reason why we assume that a code of conduct specifies what
the player expects from others is that, first, this is how the majority of social norms
are built and, second, it allows us to have a well-defined notion of agreement between
players when the game is asymmetric and players have different roles.1 Formally, a
code of conduct ri is a 1 × N vector for which each coordinate j corresponds to
a mapping from a set of signals Y j to the subset of mixed strategies S j .2 We think
of codes of conduct as social norms that emerge when people interact in familiar
games. Specifically, each player chooses a code of conduct that everyone is supposed
to follow (what to play conditional on each private signal y j ) and simultaneously




ri = (r ji ) j∈I : ∀ j ∈ I, r ji ∈ S
Y j
j and
∀y j ∈ Y j , r ji (y j ) ∈ S j
}
,
1 Note that in symmetric two player games there is no ambiguity in referring to observing an informative
signals that may reveal whether the opponent is using the same strategy or not, but if the game is asymmetric
the notion of “same strategy” can be captured with codes of conduct as players may agree on what each
player should do.
2 Similar to Tennenholtz (2004), but unlike Kalai et al. (2010), codes of conduct allow players to randomize
among their  strategies.
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where S
Y j
j represents the set of all mappings with domain Y j and range S j .
3 For sake
of simplicity and to avoid existence issues, we assume that the minmax strategies and
any mixed strategy equilibrium of the underlying game  belongs to R0.4 We write
r ∈ R = ×i R0 for the profile of codes of conduct. With some abuse of notation, we
write ri (yi ) = r ii (yi ).
Crucial to codes of conduct is the ability of players to receive signals about the
codes of conduct used by opponents. We model this by assuming that for each r ∈ R
there is a probability distribution π(·|r) ∈ (Y ) over Y . We let πi (·|r) denote the
marginal probability distribution of π(·|r) over Yi . For any yi ∈ Yi , let πi (yi |r) be the
probability of yi given r ∈ R.





ui (r1(y1), . . . , rN (yN ))π(y|r).
Note that codes of conduct determine both how players behave as a function of the
signals they receive and the probability distribution over the signals players receive
about each others’ codes of conduct. As a result, the expected payoff of player i
can be decomposed into two parts: the first part ui depends on the actual play, that
is, ri (yi ) = σi for each i ∈ I ; while the second part π(y|r) is determined by both
what players planned to choose and what they expected from their opponents, that is,
r = ((r j1 ) j∈I , . . . , (r jN ) j∈I ).
The timeline of the self-referential game is as follows:
1. Each player simultaneously chooses ri , which is not observed by the other players.
2. Each player privately observes the realization yi of his own signal.
3. Each player chooses a strategy σi according to ri .
A Nash equilibrium in the self-referential game G (or a self-referential equilibrium)




ui (ri (yi ), r−i (y−i ))π(y|r) ≥
∑
y∈Y
ui (r˜i (yi ), r−i (y−i ))π(y|r˜i , r−i ).
3 In contrast to Kalai et al. (2010), we assume that players do not randomize when they are choosing their
codes of conduct, that is, a mixed code of conduct ρi ∈ (R0). However, this would not make a difference
since the probability distribution over signals depends on the actual code of conduct profile r . In their
setting it matters because players condition directly on their opponents’ conditional devices so after the
randomization players know their opponents’ choice. To avoid this difficulty, their space of commitment
devices prohibits some responses to pure choices.
4 Notice that players could always ignore the signals and play , and this in turn implies that they can
attain any equilibrium of . However, our codes of conduct space does not satisfy the “voluntary” condition
proposed by Kalai et al. (2010) because although players can choose without conditioning on the signal
they observe (what they called “unconditioned play”) this might still induce different signal distributions
and result in some conditioning by their opponents, therefore violating their “private play” condition.
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3 The folk theorem
Social norms are essentially based on a broad notion of “reciprocity,” meaning that
people conform and expect others to conform, and people would conform if all others
conform.We proceed to define a self-referential framework within which social norms
might be such that if people are likely to act according to the current social norm,
then alternative behavior should be visible to other people. We first assume that each
player is able to detect all the opponents that do not choose the same code of conduct
prescribed by the conventional norm. In other words, players can directly observe
their opponents’ codes of conduct as in Tennenholtz (2004) and Kalai et al. (2010).
Specifically, we say that the self-referential game G permits detection if for any code
of conduct profile r ∈ R where ri = r j for all i, j , and for each player i , there exists
a subset of signals Y ij ⊂ Y j for all players j = i such that π j (Y ij |r˜i , r−i ) = 1 for
any r˜i = ri and π j (Y ij |r) = 0. We view this detection notion to be plausible in small
communities, and when players delegate their play either to an agent (with irreversible
compensation schemes) or to programs (for example financial trading and proxies; see
Section 4).
Next, we state our first main result:
Theorem 1 If vi = ui (σ ) ≥ ui for all players i with strategy profile σ ∈ S and
G permits detection, then there exists an r ∈ R such that (v1, . . . , vN ) is a Nash
equilibrium payoff of G.
Proof Take any σ ∈ S such that for any i , ui (σ ) ≥ ui . Consider the code of conduct
ri ∈ R0 that prescribes
r ji (y j ) =
{
σ j if y j /∈ Y kj for all k ∈ I,
σ kj otherwise.
If all players choose ri , any player i would get Ui (r) = ui (σ ). Contrary, if player
i adheres to some r˜i so that r˜i (yi ) = σ˜i for all yi ∈ Yi and any σ˜i ∈ Si ; and
r˜ ji (y j ) = r ji (y j ), he getsUi (r˜i , r−i ) = ui . It follows then that r is a Nash equilibrium
of the self-referential game. 	unionsq
This theorem is similar to the “benchmark theorem” in Levine and Pesendorfer (2007)
with the difference that we consider asymmetry and more than two players. Notice
that to obtain a full folk theorem, for example, for games that do not have Pareto
efficient payoffs in pure strategies or pure minmax strategies, we do not need to
use jointly controlled lotteries as Kalai et al. (2010) require because players do not
condition directly on opponents’ codes of conduct, and hence they can commit to
randomize after receiving information about opponents’ codes of conduct. Since we
can accommodate correlated strategies by definingSi as a subset of such strategies and
assuming that players have access to a public randomization device, our folk theorem
attains efficiency unlike program equilibria (Tennenholtz 2004).
123
A folk theorem with codes of conduct and communication 15
3.1 Only some players informed
While it may be a reasonable approximation that players can detect whether or not
some other players use the same code of conduct as themselves, in many settings it
is reasonable to suppose that they can do so only for a small subset of other players
who they observe closely. Depending on the context, a small group of members in
a community might be able to identify who comply with the established convention
but may require the help of other members to inflict a social punishment on deviators.
Relaxing the observability assumption, we imposed above creates a difficulty when
establishing a folk theorem because players needs to communicate what they observe
about others’ codes of conduct, and they must have an incentive to report truthfully.
We find that the property the self-referential gamemust satisfy to prove a folk theorem
is that each player’s code of conduct is observed by at least two other players when
they can publicly communicate. This observability assumption is weaker than the one
imposed by Tennenholtz (2004) and Kalai et al. (2010).
We assume a cheap talk communication stage: after receiving their private signals
yi ∈ Yi , players simultaneously make announcements zi ∈ Z0 that can be observed by
everyone.5 The set of possible announcements Z0 is finite and common to all players.
A profile of announcements is z ∈ Z = ×i Z0. Note that the identity of both the
announcer and the subset of players who are thought to have deviated are crucial. Let
zDi ∈ Z0 be player i’s announcement pointing that a subset of opponents D ⊆ I have
chosen a different code of conduct (that is some players potentially adhere to a different
social norm). We require that there be at least 2N of such possible announcements,
that is, #Z0 ≥ 2N . We allow for not sending a message {∅} ∈ Z0.
A strategy for player i consists of an announcement policy mi : Yi → Z0 and an
implementation policy φi (·, yi ) : Z → Si given any private signal yi ∈ Yi . In an
extended self-referential game E , a code of conduct now specifies r ji = (m ji , φ ji ) for
each j ∈ I , which belongs to the common space of codes of conduct
R1 =
{







∀y j ∈ Y j ,m ji (y j ) ∈ Z0,∀(z, y j ) ∈ Z × Y j , φ ji (z, y j ) ∈ S j
}
.
As before codes of conduct not only determine behavior as a function of signals, but
also the probability distribution over the signals; for r ∈ ×i R1 we continue to denote
this by π(·|r) ∈ (Y ).
To prove a folk theorem, we require that each player is observed by at least two
other players. This avoids the possibility that one player deviates, and at the same
time, points the finger at the only person who is able to monitor her. In this case, the
remaining players do not know who to punish and may not be able to punish both.
Formally, we say that the extended self-referential game E weakly permits detection,
5 Note that we do not require complicated protocols between players or the participation of a mediator as
in Forges (1986) and Myerson (1986). Also, the sort of communication we model is akin to Forges (1990)
as players informally talk to everyone and the order of how announcements are made does not change our
results.
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meaning that for any code of conduct profile r ∈ R with ri = r j for all i, j , and for
any player i there is subsets of signals Y ij ⊂ Y j ,Y ik ⊂ Yk for at least two distinct
players j, k = i such that π j (Y ij |r˜ i , r−i ) = πk(Y ik |r˜ i , r−i ) = 1 for any r˜i = ri
and π j (Y ij |r) = πk(Y ik |r) = 0. What weak detection says in a sense is that there
are “neutral” witnesses, that is, people who observe wrongdoing but who cannot be
credibly accused of wrongdoing by the wrongdoer and this information is common
knowledge in the society.
We are now in a position to state the second main result of the paper:
Theorem 2 For all σ ∈ S such that vi = ui (σ ) ≥ ui for all i ∈ I , if the extended
self-referential game E weakly permits detection, then there is an r ∈ R such that
(v1, . . . , vN ) is a Nash equilibrium payoff of E.
Proof Take σ ∈ S such that ui (σ ) ≥ ui for all i . We construct ri ∈ R0 as follows.
Let m ji be such that m
j
i (y j ) = zkj if y j ∈ Y kj and m ji (y j ) = {∅} otherwise. Also,
φ
j
i (z, y j ) = σ kj for all y j ∈ Y kj or for all z ∈ Z such that zkl ∈ z for some l, k ∈ I ;
otherwise φ ji (z, y j ) = σ j . If all players choose ri then Ui (r) = ui (σ ). We begin by
checking potential deviations. It suffices to check the following cases. Suppose player
i chooses r˜i with m˜ii (yi ) = zki for all yi ∈ Yi and φ˜ii (z) = σ˜i ∈ Si for all yi ∈ Yi ,
z ∈ Z . By weak permit detection, there is a player j = i that receives y j ∈ Y ij and
would announce zij so player i would face his minmax payoffUi (r˜i , r−i ) = ui , even if
player j = k there will be a mutually accusation which is not possible. Alternatively,
player i chooses r˜i with m˜ii (yi ) = mii (yi ) and φ˜ii (z, yi ) = σ˜i ∈ Si for all yi ∈ Yi ,
z ∈ Z . Again, by weak permit detection, there is a player j = i that receives y j ∈ Y ij
so will make the announcement zij , and therefore player i would obtain his minmax
payoff Ui (r˜i , r−i ) = ui . 	unionsq
The reason for requiring that each player is monitored by at least two other players
is that if players respond to unique announcements, then a player can always foil the
system by choosing a different code of conduct and announcing another player has
“misbehaved,” since communication is based on cheap talk messages. At worst, when
he is detected there will be two such announcements so his opponents not only do not
know who to punish, but also may not be able to punish both announcers. However,
if the self-referential game weakly permits detection then we can specify that when
three players announce deviations and one points to the others, then the player who has
two accusations is punished. In addition to circumventing the problem of meaningful
announcements, communication raises the issue that players may not report observa-
tions if they would be punished by doing so. But such incentives are also corrected
within the self-referential framework since the cheap talk messages are part of the
code of conduct, and consequently can be detected. This is why costless communi-
cation becomes a “signal” device in this context. Thus, we construct equilibria where
players voluntarily communicate what they observed about their opponents’ codes of
conduct and show that communication is a powerful tool to allow players to coordinate
behavior when they do not share consensus on whether all players comply with the
conventional norm.
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4 Application: codes of conduct as computer algorithms
As online markets grow, people are using more often computer programs to trade on
their behalf, such as “proxies” that bid on online auctions and/or keep track of posted
prices, and such as click stream pricing techniques used by many websites. Sellers
that operate through websites have lots of commitment power and could use computer
programs employed by the buyers. Therefore, a natural physical model of strategies
is that players play by submitting computer programs to play on their behalf. We next
describe how self-referential games formalize these ideas and encompass the notion
of program equilibrium (Tennenholtz 2004).
In the self-referential framework, computer programs work as follows. Fix a signal
profile set Y and break the program into two parts, one of which generates Y based
on analyzing the programs, the other of which maps Y into the strategy profile set S.
The programs also receive as input the program of the other player, that is, programs
work as files as well. A well-known result is the impossibility of running an algorithm
in which we are able to read the opponent’s program and best respond to it. On the
other hand, it is still possible to write down a computer program that makes a binary
choice: give one response if both programs are the same, and give an alternative
response if different. Specifically, there is a finite language L of computer statements,
and a finite limit l on the length of a program.6 The space of computer programs is
P = {(xn)n=1t ∈ L|t ≤ l}, the set of all sequences in L of length less than or equal to
l. Each program pi ∈ P produces outputs pi : P × P → {1, 2, . . . ,∞} × Si .7 The
interpretation is that the program pi (p1, p2) = (νi , σi ) produces the result σi after νi
steps. In case νi = ∞, the program does not halt. Notice that depending on L these
programs can be either Turing or finite state machines. A self-referential strategy is
a pair consisting of a default strategy σ i ∈ Si and a program, ri = (σ i , pi ). After
players submit their programs p1, p2, each program pi is given itself and the program
submitted by the opposing player p−i as inputs. All programs are halted after ν steps.
If pi (p1, p2) = (νi , σi ) and νi ≤ ν, that is, the program halted in time we then define
the mapping ri : P×P → Si as follows: ri (p1, p2) = σi , otherwise ri (p1, p2) = σ i .
Finally, to map these computer algorithms to a self-referential game we take Y = S.
The probability distribution π(·|r) is given by π(y|r) = 1 if yi = ri (p1, p2) for all i ,
and π(y|r) = 0 otherwise.
We now define a specific notion of self-referential games that is suitable for this
context.
Definition 1 The strategy space Si is self-referential with respect to the deadline ν if
for every pair of actions ai , ai there exists a strategy σi = (di , pi ) ∈ Si , such that
pi (d˜, p˜) =
{
ν, ai if d˜ = di , p˜ = pi ,
νi , ai otherwise.
6 For ease of exposition, we do not describe the formal metalanguage, but we assume a standard language
that allows logic statements (see, for example, Hopcroft and Ullman 1979).
7 This analysis can be readily extended to the case that there are more than two players.
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The next example shows that there are games that satisfy this definition of self-
referential strategies and illustrates that we can easily construct self-referential
equilibria with efficient outcomes that are not feasible in the baseline game for any
Nash equilibria.
Example 1 We consider a two-player trading game where each player owns an object
that can be tradedwith the opponent. The action space is A = {0, 1}, where 0 represents
“not trade with your opponent” and 1 represents “trade with your opponent.” The good
is worth γ > 1 to the opponent, and 1 to the owner. The players’ dominant strategy is
to keep the good for themselves and the Nash equilibrium of the game is a = (0, 0).
We will show that instead of an entire strategy space, a simple strategy satisfies
definition 1 and that the cooperative outcome can be sustained in a self-referential
equilibrium. Let the default strategy be σ i = 0, no trading. Here, the language L is
the Windows command language and the listing (program) pi is given below:
@echo off




echo n | comp %2 %4






This program runs from the Windows command line, and takes as inputs four
arguments: a digit describing the “own” default action, an “own”filename, an opponent
default action and an opponent filename. If the opponent default action is 0 and the
opponent program p−i is identical to the listing above, the program pi generates as its
final output the number 1; otherwise, it generates the number 0.8 Since it has access
to sequence of its own instructions, it compares them to the sequence of opponent
program instructions to check if they are the same or not.9 Although in this listing all
the actual work is done by the “comp” command it is easy enough to write a program
that compares two files, and takes a number of steps proportional to the length of the
shorter file. In other words, the program works in finite, and relatively short time.
When both players choose the above program, the two programs are syntactically
the same, and then both choose a = 1 and obtain γ . Yet, if only one player submits
a different program that differs syntactically from the proposed listing, that player
receives at most 1 < γ . We have shown that there is a self-referential equilibrium
8 Note that we could allow for a mixed strategy, for example, when the program calls for action 1 instead
it could call action 1 with some positive probability 1 > α > 0.
9 In the same spirit of social norms, the fact that the program has access to the syntax sequence of the other
program it does not imply that it can execute the other program’s output.
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for the trading game that yields always trading by both players if the output actions
prescribed by each program are executed simultaneously. Notice that wemight be able
to sustain any feasible individually rational payoff, as we showed in Theorem 1, if we
replace the default strategy by the minmax strategy and target strategy by the aimed
individually rational strategy profile.
5 Conclusion
We showed a folk theorem for normal form games where players observe perfectly
informative signals that point at deviant codes of conduct, and hence deviators are
punishedwith certainty.We further weakened the assumption about who observe these
signals, highlighting the importance of communication in situations where players
have the ability to use conditional commitment devices. We provided an important
application of codes of conduct in this specific environment and described how these
strategies can be represented as computer algorithms.
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